Plato’s Euthyphro features a discussion between Socrates and Euthyphro on the definition of piety. Socrates is a philosopher, and Euthyphro is a professional priest. The discussion occurs as Socrates and Euthyphro meet at the king-archon’s court. Socrates is indicted for corrupting the youth and being impious to the gods. Meanwhile, Euthyphro is going to indict his father because his father has killed a laborer who is himself a murderer. Euthyphro’s family accuses Euthyphro of being impious, while Euthyphro accuses his father of impiety and declares that his relatives are ignorant of the meaning of piety. As a result, Socrates asks Euthyphro to define piety. They find no satisfactory definition in their discussion. This paper argues that Socrates’ twists of terms and establishment of unachievable standards for a definition lead this discussion to predicaments.
When Socrates asks Euthyphro for a definition of piety, Euthyphro confidently states that “What is dear to the god is pious, what is not is impious” and shortly afterward revises his definition into “The pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is impious.”[1] We will focus on how Socrates refutes the latter of the two definitions in this section.
Socrates’ responses can besummarized as:[2]
1.1.1: Because an action is pious, the gods love the action.
1.1.2: It isn’t because the gods love the action that the action is pious.
1.2.1: Because an action is being loved by the gods, the action is god-loved.
1.2.2: It isn’t because the action is god-loved that it is being loved by the gods.
1.3.1: “Pious” is not the same as “god-loved.”
1.3.2: “Pious” cannot be defined as “god-loved.”
1.4.1: This definition Euthyphro gives is not satisfactory because it only gives a
quality or effect of piety
By mixing “god-loved” with “being-loved by the gods,” Socrates’ responses make defining piety difficult. In his responses, Socrates clarifies the distinction between “god-loved” and “being loved by the gods.” “An action is being loved by the god” is a description of the way god affects the action, and “the action is god-loved” is a description of the quality of the action. The former is the cause of the latter, but the latter is not the cause of the former. In this way, Socrates points out that piety cannot be directly defined as “god-loved.” However, Euthyphro uses “being loved by the gods” instead of “god-loved” in his definition. When Socrates concludes 1.4.1 from 1.3.2 and argues that Euthyphro’s definition is unsatisfactory, he mixes up the two terms.
Without the concept of “god-loved,” Socrates’ argument in this section loses effectiveness with a minor revision of Euthyphro’s definition. It is true that Socrates can still refute this definition Euthyphro gives. Like the distinction between “god-loved” and “being loved by the gods,” “an action being loved by the gods” is not the same as “the action is pious:” “An action being loved by the gods” is the cause of “The action is pious,” but “The action is pious” is not the cause of “The action is
loved by the gods.” However, to make Socrates’ argument ineffective, Euthyphro can revise his definition by saying, “Actions that make all the gods love it are pious, while the opposite, actions that make all the gods hate it are impious.” If an expression identifies X but nothing other than X, this expression can be seen as a definition of X. So, it is acceptable, and sometimes necessary, to define X by pointing out an effect of X, given that nothing other than X has the effect. For example, we can define allergens as things that trigger allergies in specific individuals because every allergen triggers some allergies, and no substance other than allergens triggers allergies. In this case, Euthyphro can define piety with its exclusive effect, namely, that the gods love the action. Hence, the concept of “god-loved” creates difficulties in defining piety that would otherwise be solved by a minor revision of Euthyphro’s original definition.
After showing Euthyphro that piety cannot be defined as “being loved by the gods,” Socrates encourages him to define piety by its relationship with justice. So, Euthyphro gives the definition, “The godly and pious is the part of just that is concerned with the care of the gods.”[3]
2.1.1: Socrates: Is “the care of the gods” the kind of care that make gods better?
2.1.2: Euthyphro: No. The care of the gods is another kind that services to the gods.
2.2.1: Socrates: What do the gods achieve in our service to the gods?
2.2.2: Euthyphro: We give them sacrifices and prayers.
2.3.1: Socrates: How do sacrifices and prayers benefit the gods?
2.3.2: Euthyphro: We give the gods honor, reverence, and we please them.
2.4.1: Socrates: Because the pious is pleasing to the gods, the pious is necessarily
beneficial and dear to the gods.
2.5.1: Socrates: The pious and the god-loved are different.
2.5.2: Socrates: This definition Euthyphro gives is not satisfactory.
Socrates overlooks some parts of Euthyphro’s responses, which creates difficulties in finding a satisfactory definition. In 2.4.1, Socrates does not respond to “honor” and “reverence” proposed in 2.3.2. When talking about 2.5.1, he does not address “beneficial” proposed in 2.4.1. Recall in section1, 1.4.1, Socrates argues that Euthyphro told him “an affect or a quality of [piety], that the pious has the quality of being loved by all the gods.”[5] In this case, Socrates only states that being loved by the gods is insufficientfor the definition of “piety,” but has never concluded that the pious is not being loved by all the gods. Therefore, he does not prove that “being dear to the gods” cannot be a part of the definition of piety. Had Socrates not overlooked giving “honor,” “reverence,” and “beneficial” to the gods, Euthyphro could have said, “Surely, piety is not just what is dear to the god, but it is what gives honor, reverence to the gods, that pleases and benefits them.” In this case, the discussion would not have so readily ended.
In addition, Socrates requires Euthyphro to explain the meaning of his definition, and his requirement for the explanation is unachievable. When Socrates and Euthyphro keep explaining one word with another, they cannot settle on a particular word, so they either recess to previous words or continue finding more words ad infinitum. For example, 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 clarify “the care of the gods” by “services to the gods;” 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 specify “servicing the gods” by providing the fine
things the gods achieve. There are many other similar examples in this section. The discussion ended because Euthyphro was persuaded that “god-loved” should not be involved in the definition of piety[6], but had the discussion continued, Socrates would ask Euthyphro to explain “god-loved,” and to explain the explanation for “god-loved” and the explanation of explanation, ad infinitum. When the chain of explanation does not grow infinitely long, it circulates back to the original term. Specifically, to explain “beneficial to the gods” in 2.3.1, Euthyphro and Socrates, in 2.4.1, finally say that it is necessarily beneficial to the gods, which is a tautology. If Socrates had not given up the attempt to explain “beneficial,” Euthyphro would repeat his answer that it is “honor, reverence, and to please them,” and the dialogues would go into a cycle. Hence, even if the dialogue is free from the twists of terms or overlooking of terms mentioned in the previous paragraphs of this essay, the dialogue is still unlikely to get a satisfactory definition of piety because of Socrates’ standard for explanation.
In conclusion, the close reading of two pieces of the dialogue demonstrates that Socrates’ responses are full of twists and overlooking of terms, and his high standard of explanation makes finding a satisfactory definition of piety impossible.
[1] For these definitions, see Plato, Euthyphro. Translated by G.M.A. Grube, revised by John M. Cooper, in Plato: Five Dialogues, Hackett Publishing Company, 2002, p. 8 and p. 11. All the cited texts in this essay are from Grube’s translation of the Euthyphro; all the summaries are also based on this translation of the Euthyphro from Grube. This section and the following section are labelled for clarity. The section number labels are not in the text of Plato or Grube.
[3] For this definition, see Grube's translation of the Euthyphro, pp. 11.
[5] See Grube’s translation of the Euthyphro, pp. 14.
[6] As shown in the previous paragraphs in this essay, Euthyphro does not need to give up the attempts to define “piety” as “god-loved” or “being loved by the gods.”
Works Cited
Grube, George Maximilian Anthony, trans. Plato: Five Dialogues. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002.
