Editor’s Note: Fanou wrote this paper for his PHILOS 25A: Ancient Philosophy course at UC Berkeley and kindly agreed to share his work with us in this volume. No changes, besides reformatting, were made to the work.
In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle examines the question of what the human good is and ultimately identifies happiness as this good. In this paper, I will analyze how Aristotle characterizes the human good in the Nicomachean Ethics I.1-2 and examine his argument in chapter I.7 that happiness is this highest human good. I will then raise an objection to Aristotle’s argument for happiness as the human good and consider how Aristotle might defend his argument.
First, I will examine how Aristotle characterizes the human good. Aristotle begins with what appears to be a straightforward empirical observation—that every human activity aims at some perceived good or end (1094a). Aristotle then makes a crucial distinction between two types of ends: cases where the end is the activity itself, and cases where the end is some product distinct from the activity. For instance, in playing music, the end (good music) is inherent in the activity itself, while in building a house, the end (the completed house) is separate from the act of construction. Where the end is distinct from the activity, Aristotle considers this end to be “by nature better than the activity” (1094a5). This reveals an important principle in Aristotle’s thinking—that which something aims at or exists for the sake of is superior to that which does the aiming or exists for its sake. The house is more valuable than the mere act of building because the building process exists precisely to bring about the house.
This principle becomes especially significant when Aristotle introduces the hierarchical relationship between the different ends that different crafts pursue. He observes that the ends of some crafts are pursued for the sake of other, higher crafts—for instance, bridle-making aims at producing bridles, but this is done for the sake of horsemanship, which in turn serves generalship (1094a10-14). However, Aristotle rejects the idea that this chain of ends and crafts can extend infinitely. He reasons that if every end were pursued only for the sake of something else, with no final end, then desire and action would be “empty and futile” (1094a20). Therefore, Aristotle concludes that there must be some highest end which is pursued for its own sake and for the sake of which all lesser ends are pursued. It is this highest end which Aristotle identifies as the most choiceworthy “good” (1094a20).
Having established that there must be some highest good, Aristotle argues we need to understand what this good is to properly direct our lives, just as archers need a target to aim at (1094a25). His argument for which discipline pursues this good follows a clear logical structure: 1) Since this is the highest good for which all other goods are pursued, it must be studied by the most authoritative science; 2) The most authoritative science would be the one that governs and determines the role of other sciences; 3) Political science has this character since it determines which sciences should be studied, governs even prestigious crafts like generalship and rhetoric, and legislates what should be done or avoided (1094b1-7); 4) Therefore, political science must be the discipline most concerned with the highest good.
Thus, in these early passages Aristotle characterizes the human good as: 1) That at which all human activities and pursuits aim; 2) An end that is pursued for its own sake, not for the sake of anything else; 3) The highest end or best good achievable in action; 4) The aim or end of political science, the most authoritative craft.
Having examined how Aristotle characterizes the human good, I will now analyze his argument in chapter 7 of book 1 that happiness constitutes this highest good. Before starting, in this argument for why happiness is the highest good, Aristotle employs several terms that require clarification. When Aristotle speaks of something being “choiceworthy,” he means that it is rationally desirable or worth choosing—not merely that we happen to want it, but that we have good reason to choose it. Something being “most choiceworthy” means it is what we have most reason to choose over all alternatives. By “highest good,” Aristotle means the ultimate end, which was discussed above, that gives purpose and value to all other goods.
1) Premise: The highest good is the good that is the most complete and the most self-sufficient (1097a25-b6).
2) Premise: A good is complete if it is always chosen for itself and never for something else (1097a30-34).
3) Premise: A good is more complete than another which is chosen both for itself and for other ends (1097b1-6).
4) Premise: We choose happiness always for itself and never for anything else (1097b1).
5) Premise: Happiness is never chosen both for itself and for other ends (1097b8).
6) Intermediate step from 2, 3, 4, and 5: Happiness is the most complete good.
7) Premise: A self-sufficient end makes life choiceworthy and lacking nothing (1097b15).
8) Premise: Happiness makes life choiceworthy and lacking nothing (1097b17).
9) Premise: Happiness the most choiceworthy good as no addition of other goods would make it more choiceworthy (1097b17-19).
10) Intermediate step from 7, 8 and 9: Happiness is the most self sufficient good.
11) Conclusion from 1, 6 and 10: Therefore, happiness is the highest good (1097b20-22).
This argument introduces two key criteria for the highest good—completeness and self-sufficiency—and proceeds to show that happiness uniquely satisfies both. First, Aristotle establishes that happiness is the most complete good by showing it alone is chosen purely for its own sake (premises 2-6). All other goods, like honor, pleasure, and virtue, are chosen both for themselves and for the sake of happiness, making them less complete. Second, he demonstrates that happiness is the most self-sufficient good by showing it makes life lacking in nothing and cannot be made more choiceworthy by adding other goods (premises 7-10). The soundness of Aristotle’s argument lies in how it shows happiness uniquely satisfies Aristotle’s self-established criteria for the highest good.
Having outlined the logic of Aristotle’s argument I will now consider possible objections to the argument. A serious objection to Aristotle’s argument emerges, not in the reconstructed argument itself, but rather when we connect his initial characterization of the highest good with his later argument that happiness is this good. In chapters 1-2, Aristotle characterizes the highest good as the ultimate end that gives purpose and value to all other goods—it must be that for the sake of which all other ends are pursued. Thus, if there exists some good (X) for which happiness is not the ultimate end, then happiness cannot be the highest good as initially characterized. Truth can be said to be this good (X). Truth appears to be an end that is not pursued for the sake of happiness. It seems to have its own independent value and purpose that is not derived from or subordinate to happiness. This can be seen in several ways. First, we often pursue truth even when it might diminish rather than promote happiness—for instance, seeking out uncomfortable truths about ourselves or accepting harsh realities. Second, many disciplines like mathematics, theoretical science, and arguably even philosophy pursue truth as their ultimate aim, not as a means to happiness. Third, if we examine our reasons for valuing truth, they seem to be independent of any connection to happiness—we value truth because it corresponds to reality, helps us understand the world, and has intrinsic worth, not because it serves happiness.
Aristotle might respond to this objection in the following way: He could argue that this objection misunderstands his conception of happiness (eudaimonia). For Aristotle, happiness is not merely a feeling of pleasure or contentment, but rather consists of excellent activity in accordance with virtue. Since the pursuit of truth through theoretical contemplation is one of the highest forms of virtuous activity, pursuing truth is actually an instance of pursuing happiness properly understood. Thus, when we value truth intrinsically or engage in theoretical disciplines like mathematics and philosophy, we are actualizing our rational nature in its highest form, which is central to Aristotle’s conception of happiness.
However, this defense fails to address the fundamental problem. By simply incorporating the pursuit of truth into his definition of happiness, Aristotle is avoiding rather than resolving the conflict between these two distinct ends. The pursuit of truth and the pursuit of happiness remain fundamentally different activities with different aims—one seeks to understand reality regardless of its impact on human wellbeing, while the other seeks human flourishing. Aristotle’s attempt to subsume truth-seeking under happiness through definitional moves cannot eliminate this basic distinction between these two independent ends.
