Being refuted is an embarrassing experience for many, but it is a critical part of philosophical investigation in Plato’s Socratic dialogues. The refutations from Socrates often come in the form of questions or requests for explanations. As the interlocutor answers these inquiries, he finds himself in a contradiction. In the Euthyphro, for example, Socrates asks the titular character to define piety, since Euthyphro himself dares to prosecute his father for murder. When Euthyphro states that what is dear to the gods is pious, Socrates asks if Euthyphro believes the gods are in disagreement. As Euthyphro subsequently affirms that gods take different stances towards the same action, he reaches the contradictory conclusion that an action can be pious and impious simultaneously.[1] He thus has to reject his initial definition and present a new proposition. This method of refutation can be applied to a single thinker with a slight modification. One can raise a hypothesis and doubt it afterward, assuming the roles of both the interlocutor and Socrates.
The benefit of Socrates’s refutation is not obvious, as he usually disproves all the answers an interlocutor provides. At the end of the Euthyphro, Socrates deems none of the definitions satisfactory, acknowledging that he and Euthyphro “must investigate again from the beginning what piety is.”[2] Frustrated, the reader and the interlocutor might see Socrates’s refutation as a signal to give up the difficult inquiry. Contrary to the dismissive reading of the Socratic method, this paper argues that, rather than killing the discussion, refutations in the Socratic dialogues not only elicit affirmative responses but also effectively advance the discussion by facilitating the construction of hypotheses and the exploration of new areas of inquiry.
Socrates’s supportive attitude shows that he aims to explain ethical terms positively rather than discouraging the interlocutor. An interlocutor often deems it impossible to give a satisfactory definition when frustrated by Socrates’s refutation. For example, when Euthyphro complains to Socrates: “I have no way of telling you what I have in mind, for whatever proposition we put forward goes around and refuses to stay put where we establish it,” he sees Socrates’s refutation as a cue for him to tone down his confidence.[3] Socrates’s response, “I am as eager as you are to find a way to teach me about piety, and do not give up before you do,” thereby provides encouragement in an empathetic tone. He frames his relationship with the interlocutor as that of cooperators in an open inquiry rather than as debaters. More specifically, by positioning himself as a humble learner, Socrates elevates Euthyphro’s authority and agency in this conversation, goading him to present new ideas and beliefs with confidence. Accordingly, Socrates’s attitude towards the interlocutor demonstrates that his refutations are intended to facilitate the pursuit of a positive answer.[4]
In addition, Socrates’s refutation enables his interlocutor to build a more self-consistent system of knowledge. Beliefs are not inscribed sentences in one’s mind but habits of thinking. If a person believes that the angles of a triangle add up to 180 degrees, the proposition is not always hovering over her mind—it only appears to her when some geometry problems prompt her to think so.[5] This dormant state of belief is the cause of inconsistency. A person may believe in a pair of contradicting propositions if she is never aware of one when she is aware of the other. Therefore, when Euthyphro thinks of the proposition “what is dear to the gods is pious,” he does not realize that the belief “gods are in disagreement” lies latently in his mind. Socrates’s examination, then, simultaneously activates a pair of contradictory conclusions and encourages the interlocutor to repair the inconsistency in his beliefs.
The combination of Socrates’s supportive attitude and an examination that exposes internal inconsistencies facilitates the active construction of hypotheses.[6] A person cannot conduct open inquiry alone. If she is confident that her belief is the truth, she is blind to the inconsistencies that may jeopardize its truth value. If she withholds judgment, skeptical of her ability to think through the matter, she is likely to lose the opportunity to grasp the truth, for the philosophical investigation of ethical questions is often a rare privilege in a utilitarian world. A seeker of knowledge and truth, therefore, must calibrate her level of confidence to balance the chance of making either mistake. Refutation in the Socratic dialogues, however, resolves this predicament. Socrates encourages his interlocutor to uncover his latent beliefs without restraint, then examines them closely to reject the inconsistent ones. This method brings the interlocutor closer to truth.
Furthermore, Socrates’s demand for explanations helps the interlocutor see more possibilities of investigation, thus driving the discussion towards deeper questions. When making a statement, the speaker is not aware of the implications of all her words. For example, if a person says, “I want to play chess,” the rules of chess do not occur to her all at once.[7] Nor will the fact that “playing” means moving wooden pieces around appear in her mind. Still, the person feels she understands her sentence as long as she can use it to serve her purpose. Unaware of her oblivion, the person is not motivated to interpret each word and the relationship between expressions. Accordingly, Socrates’s demand for clarification initiates an exploration of the implications of one’s statement that would be unnoticed otherwise. For instance, after Euthyphro concedes that he cannot precisely define piety, he preserves his authority: “But, to put it simply, I say that if a man knows how to say and do what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice, those are pious actions.”[8] By clouding his answer with vague terms and a seemingly confident tone, Euthyphro attempts to conclude the conversation and shut down future investigations. Socrates, on the other hand, notices that for the expression “what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice” to be valid, Euthyphro must have assumed that some prayer and sacrifice are pleasing to gods. His follow-up question for Euthyphro, “How are [the gods] benefited by what they receive from us,” opens a new realm of questions that Euthyphro does not think are possible to discuss.[9] As Socrates asks the interlocutor to explain his answer, the interlocutor reflects on the meaning of his claims that is otherwise unnoticed.
In the Socratic dialogues, where inconsistency is revealed and underlying assumptions investigated, refutation advances an inquiry rather than stifling it. Although Socrates and his interlocutor do not arrive at a satisfactory definition, the process of refuting and refining is invaluable. Socrates’s demanding questions demonstrate the intellectual humility one must possess in the pursuit of knowledge and invite the reader into a new world of inquiry hidden right under the surface of everyday life.
[1] Plato, Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo, 2nd ed., trans. G. M. A. Grube and John M. Cooper (Hackett Publishing Company, 2002), 7-9.
[2] Plato, Five Dialogues, 20.
[3] Plato, Five Dialogues, 14.
[4] Plato, Five Dialogues, 15.
[6] For an extended discussion, see Chapter 5 of Agnes Callard’s Open Socrates: The Case for a Philosophical Life (2025).
[7] Jonathan Booth, reading, December 28, 2020, in Philosophical Investigation, 3rd ed., by Ludwig Wittgenstein (Macmillan, 1968).
[8] Plato, Five Dialogues, 18.
[9] Plato, Five Dialogues, 19.
Bibliography
Booth, Jonathan. Reading, December 28, 2020. In Philosophical Investigation, 3rd ed., by Ludwig Wittgenstein. Macmillan, 1968.
Callard, Agnes. Open Socrates: The Case for a Philosophical Life. W. W. Norton & Company, 2025.
Plato. Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo. 2nd ed. Translated by G. M. A. Grube and John M. Cooper. Hackett Publishing Company, 2002.
